MAX Security routinely sends an in-depth update on the Israel-Hamas war and its impact on the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The frequency of the report is determined in accordance with the developments in the region. The pace of reporting will continue to be adjusted as the war evolves into the next phases. 

• The first phase of the ceasefire, slated to last 42 days, commenced on January 19 with the release of three Israeli hostages and Palestinian prisoners. Both parties will retain an interest in upholding this initial stage, although hurdles will persist to an extension ensuring phase two of the truce. 
• National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir’s party resigned from PM Netanyahu’s government on January 19. This highlights deepening rifts within the coalition over the truce. Although the Likud-led coalition is unlikely to collapse, political tensions will remain elevated, with protests likely to continue.  
• The Israeli cabinet expanded its war objectives to include degrading terrorist groups in the West Bank on January 17. This reflects concerns regarding the impact of Palestinian prisoners released to the West Bank under the truce, which will likely catalyze anti-Israel sentiment and increase the terrorist threat. A stabbing attack by a West Bank resident in Tel Aviv on January 18 highlights the spillover threat this poses to Israeli territory.  
• On January 16, the Houthi leader stated that the group will monitor the ceasefire and expressed its readiness to continue supporting Palestinians. This suggests that the Houthis will abstain from unprovoked attacks on Israel while the truce holds, although a resumption is plausible if the deal breaks down or Israel strikes Houthi territory in Yemen. 

Truce deal & Israeli hostages  

• Following a delay in the implementation and beginning of the truce, Israel confirmed to have received from Hamas the names of three Israeli hostages first to be released out of the list of 33 hostages. With that, at 11:15 (local time) on January 19, the first phase (42 days) of the truce agreement between Israel and Hamas came into force.  
• During the afternoon hours of January 19, the three female hostages were transferred from Hamas to the Red Cross and to the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). They were transferred to medical treatment at Shiba Medical Center in Ramat Gan. 
• As per the truce deal, four additional living hostages will be released on January 25, and three hostages will then be released each week to cover the entire list of 33 Israeli hostages (some are deceased) by the end of the 42 days.  
• On the 16th day of Phase 1, Israel and Hamas are set to begin the negotiations over Phase 2 of the ceasefire agreement. If the parties reach an agreement, Phase 2 will entail a complete Israeli withdrawal from the enclave, the release of the remaining hostages, and the “restoration of sustainable calm”. 

Palestinian prisoners and detainees 

• A total of 1,904 Palestinian prisoners will be released by Israel in the first phase of the ceasefire deal. 
• Israel’s Justice Ministry on January 18 reportedly released a list of 735 Palestinian security prisoners out of the 1904 slated to be released. Out of this list, 95 Palestinian prisoners were released on the first day. 78 of whom went to the West Bank through Beitunia and around 13 to East Jerusalem.  

IDF’s partial withdrawal from Gaza and IDP movement  

• The IDF will withdraw from densely populated areas toward the Israel-Gaza border, including from the Netzarim Corridor (on Day 22) that bisects the Strip.
• The IDF will gradually reduce its deployment along the Philadelphi Corridor, with a complete withdrawal expected before day 50.  
• The Rafah border crossing with Egypt will reopen for pedestrian movement after the release of all Israeli women hostages. 50 wounded militants will be allowed to cross daily accompanied by three individuals, with Israeli and Egyptian approval. 
• On day seven, pedestrians will be allowed to cross the Netzarim Corridor and return to the northern Gaza Strip via the coastal al-Rashid Street; on day 22, they will also be allowed to cross the central Salah ad-Din Street. Vehicles will be allowed to cross the Corridor on day seven, following inspection by a private company.  

Political developments in Israel 

• In a speech on January 18, Prime Minister (PM) Benjamin Netanyahu stated that both US President Joe Biden and President-elect Donald Trump agreed to back Israel if it concludes that the negotiations over Phase 2 are futile and decides to resume its military campaign in Gaza. He also denied that the IDF would withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor and reiterated that he did not renounce the war objective to dismantle Hamas’ military and governance capabilities.  
• On January 19, National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir’s far-right Otzma Yehudit party quit the governing coalition over their opposition to the agreement. Ben Gvir indicated his readiness to rejoin the government on the condition that Israel resumes the war to obtain all of the war objectives. He also indicated that he will not operate to collapse PM Netanyahu’s government.  
• Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, head of the far-right Religious Zionist Party, rejected Ben Gvir’s call to leave the coalition on January 19. He stated that his decision was informed by “national responsibility” and because it would allow him to advocate for a resumption of hostilities following the first phase.  

Militancy in Israel and the West Bank  

• On January 17, Israel’s security cabinet voted to expand its formal war objectives. This was to include the goal of significantly harming the capabilities of terrorist organizations in the West Bank and strengthening the security of Israeli settlements and traffic arteries. Minister Smotrich had reportedly requested the measure. In the same meeting, the cabinet had approved the ceasefire deal. 
• A Palestinian from the West Bank’s Tulkarem on January 18 conducted a stabbing attack in Tel Aviv, wounding one civilian. An armed civilian shot and killed him. 
• The IDF on January 19 announced preparations for the release of Palestinian security prisoners to the West Bank. It announced that it would reinforce the IDF troops’ presence across the region and establish additional checkpoints on key traffic routes. The IDF also announced that it would work to prevent Palestinians from holding celebrations in the region and conduct security operations to mitigate terrorism and rioting. 
• As part of the truce agreement, Israel is set to release 90 Palestinian security prisoners to the West Bank and East Jerusalem on January 19. Several high-ranking terrorists are set to be released to the West Bank during the truce’s first phase. This includes Zakaria Zubeidi, a prominent terrorist of Fatah’s al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades (AAMB). He is slated to be released to Jenin.  
• According to reports from January 17, the Palestinian Authority (PA) reached a truce agreement with Hamas and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad’s (PIJ) Jenin Battalions. The latter reportedly agreed to hand in their weapons and allow PA security forces to freely operate in the Jenin Refugee Camp. The agreement follows the PA’s “Homeland Protection” counter-militancy operation  

Yemen 

• On January 16, Houthi leader Abdul Malik al-Houthi reportedly stated that Israel had failed to achieve its declared objectives with its military operations in Gaza. He noted that the Houthis would monitor the agreement’s implementation and highlighted his movement’s readiness to provide “military support to the Palestinians” if Israel breached the agreement. 
• Before the truce, on January 18, the IDF intercepted two Houthi-launched ballistic missiles. The first attack triggered Color Red sirens in central Israel and the Jerusalem area, and the second one triggered sirens in southern Israel’s Eilat area. No injuries were reported. 
• Houthi spokesperson Yahya Saree on January 19 warned the Houthis’ adversaries in the Red Sea that it would respond to any “aggressions against Yemen” during the Israel-Hamas ceasefire period with “specific military operations”. 

Belligerent parties’ motivations to favor truce 

1. The approval by both belligerent parties and the successful transfer of the first three Israeli female hostages on January 19 marks the official beginning of the truce deal’s Phase One, which the parties are likely to adhere to. From an Israeli perspective, there will be a significant interest in preserving the truce during that phase. This is because it formally only constitutes a period of temporary cessation of hostilities, in which the 33 Israeli hostages (almost a third of all Israeli captives held) will be released gradually in batches throughout the period. It was also likely important at the current juncture given the significant pressure reported by US President-elect Trump’s Middle East envoy, who aimed to secure a truce before the new administration’s inauguration day on January 20. PM Netanyahu’s decision to agree to the truce was likely partly aimed at placating the incoming administration, as well as securing several incentives the latter reportedly offered, primarily the removal of restrictions on the delivery of certain arms by the US to Israel.  
2. From Hamas’ perspective, the incoming US President-elect Trump’s pressure likely also constituted a catalyst to reach a deal, in light of Trump’s previous public threats on the matter. It is also likely partially the fruition of extensive Israeli military pressure and regional geopolitical shifts, primarily Hezbollah’s degradation and decision to cease its cross-border attacks. Furthermore, the truce entails IDF redeployments and the alleviation of significant military pressure in the Gaza Strip, as well as the significant surge of humanitarian aid to the enclave, all of which will support Hamas’ regrouping efforts. In addition, as was highlighted in the very extensive footage and picture materials depicting Hamas’ operatives parading the streets in formal uniform and managing the transfer of the Israeli hostages, this period would allow Hamas to project its retention of governance and military capabilities in the Gaza Strip, and the fact that there is currently no prominent challenge to its authority in the enclave. This is despite the extensive casualty toll and damage Hamas incurred and the Israeli plans to supplant it and install an alternative governance mechanism, which have thus far failed. This also underscores the challenges facing conventional armies in combating militant, guerilla-style organizations like Hamas, whose militants can blend within the civilian population and formally emerge during cessations of fighting.  
3. The IDF’s commitment to an incremental withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, including from the strategic assets it held, the Netzarim and Philadelphi Corridor, constitutes a significant concession by Israel. Together with the resurgence of Hamas militants and civil servants in uniform, it will be used by Hamas to further project an image of victory, curtailing the Israeli claim that Hamas was severely degraded during the war. This will amplify Israeli concerns regarding Israel’s security vis-a-vis Gaza, which may be a catalyst for the government’s desire to resume hostilities after the end of the 42 days of Phase One. This is especially in light of the voices within PM Netanyahu’s camp that the campaign to dismantle Hamas must go on. Furthermore, as the negotiations over the second phase are slated to begin on the 16th day (early February), rifts between the parties could also surface before the formal end of the first phase, delaying final IDF redeployments and potentially derailing the agreement.  

Political tensions in Israel regarding the truce 

1. The deal’s approval has deepened rifts within PM Netanyahu’s governing coalition, highlighting fragile support for the government within the more hardline right-wing political parties of Israel’s executive branch. Currently, the government coalition still retains a slight majority in the Knesset with 62/63 parliamentary seats. However, threats by Smotrich, whose party holds seven seats, to leave the coalition lest the war is not resumed would deprive the coalition of the required majority, heightening the risk of political instability. This emphasizes the leverage held by far-right members of the coalition, who view a full cessation of hostilities as a red line. Despite this, both leaders have signaled that they are unlikely to topple the government and join the opposition, likely informed by shared ideological affinities with Netanyahu’s Likud party and recognition that he provided them with considerable latitude to advance other agendas. Moreover, current opposition parties led by Yair Lapid have also indicated their willingness to provide a political safety net for PM Netanyahu to secure the current deal for the release of hostages. Nonetheless, the latest developments have left Netanyahu more vulnerable to pressure from his right-wing base to resume military operations in Gaza in due time.  
2. FORECAST: These developments can be expected to compound pre-existing societal grievances and tensions over the government’s handling of the war and ceasefire-hostages release negotiations. Right-wing elements will likely call for additional demonstrations demanding a resumption of the hostilities following the conclusion of the first phase of the deal, viewing it as a capitulation to the Palestinian group. Images showing Hamas-affiliated militants and security forces reestablishing themselves in Gaza and the release of Palestinian prisoners tried for terrorism-related offenses will fuel opposition to the ceasefire. This is based on a perception that security-related prisoners will increase militancy trends in the West Bank and Israel, which will translate into further militancy victims in Israel. Meanwhile, the temporary nature of the ceasefire will also reinvigorate protests in support of extending the truce to obtain the release of all remaining hostages at the cost of a complete evacuation of IDF forces from Gaza. Given the increased societal polarization in the country, tensions between the two factions will remain elevated. Events related to the ceasefire, such as reports of flailing negotiations or changes in the fate of hostages, will continue to affect the frequency and intensity of protest activity. 

Israeli-Palestinian tensions, terror threat emanating from West Bank to increase amid implementation of ceasefire 

1. The Israel-Hamas truce will likely function as a catalyst for incitement and increased anti-Israel sentiments rather than decrease tensions vis-a-vis the Palestinian Street. This is because Israel’s release of Palestinian security prisoners to the West Bank marks a substantial achievement for Hamas and will boost the group’s popularity among Palestinians in the West Bank. Hamas secured the release of hundreds of Palestinian prisoners, including high-profile terrorists, such as the prominent AAMB’s (Fatah-associated) Zubeidi, projecting that it fights for all Palestinian prisoners. This will support Hamas’ effort to project an image of victory and further erode the legitimacy of the PA in the eyes of the Palestinian public, which has widely been perceived as collaborating with Israel, rather than confronting it militarily. FORECAST: This will heighten the PA’s concerns about Hamas seeking to gain influence in and destabilize the West Bank and increase prospects for civil unrest and clashes between militants and PA officials, despite the reported thaw between the PA and the Jenin Refugee Camp-based militants.  
2. Moreover, Israel’s release of security prisoners will likely inspire and increase the prospects of militancy across the West Bank, and by extension potentially also in East Jerusalem and Israel itself. This is partly supported by Israeli authorities’ understanding that around 82 percent of Palestinian prisoners that were charged with terrorism offenses, return to engage in terrorism after release. This lends credence to the notion that the high hundreds of Palestinian prisoners that will be released to the West Bank, will be a destabilizing factor from Israel’s perspective. The Israeli cabinet’s decision to make a crackdown on terrorism in the West Bank a formal war objective, together with the already significant reinforcements of IDF forces to the West Bank, underscores the current Israeli concerns. This will likely translate into more forceful IDF action in the territory over the coming weeks. As indicated by the cabinet decision, security forces will likely work to bolster security protocols around Israeli settlements and traffic arteries considered particularly vulnerable to attacks against Israeli motorists. 
3. The January 18 stabbing attack in Tel Aviv, perpetrated by a Palestinian who illegally infiltrated Israel from the West Bank, demonstrates that the dynamics detailed above also increase the risk of terrorism within Israel. The attack’s coincidence with the truce deal renders it possible that the perpetrator chose the timing deliberately and aimed to undermine the Israeli populace’s sense of security by further escalating fears of a growing terrorist threat amid Israel’s slated release of hundreds of militants to the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The incident marks the first terrorist attack in the Tel Aviv-Jaffa area since a dual shooting-stabbing attack on Jaffa’s Jerusalem Boulevard in October 2024. It thus reiterates Tel Aviv’s high-profile among Palestinian assailants, as the city is known to be Israel’s cultural and economic center. CCTV footage shows the assailant approaching and attacking a group of civilians in front of a restaurant, following which he was shot by an armed civilian. This highlights a pattern in recent militant attacks in Tel Aviv in which militants tend to target the entrance areas to bars and restaurants, which are usually packed with people, indicating that those who sit in the inner parts of these compounds tend to be more secure.  
4. FORECAST: Further copycat attacks in the West Bank and Israel are liable to occur in the coming days. Police forces will maintain their ongoing campaign to identify and arrest Palestinians residing illegally in Israel to mitigate the risk of terror attacks by such individuals. 

Houthis likely to suspend attacks against Israel as long as Israel-Hamas truce agreements hold 

1. The Houthis’ launch of ballistic missiles against Israel, just before the Israel-Hamas ceasefire went into force, demonstrated the Iran-backed group’s determination to project its steadfastness in confronting Israel and backing the Palestinians as long as the truce did not come into force. The Houthi officials’ statements suggest that the Iran-backed group will abstain from unprovoked attacks against Israel as long as Hamas regards Jerusalem as fulfilling the stipulations of the truce agreement. Such a lull is likely in the Houthis’ interest as it would allow the group to recover strategic infrastructures that Israel damaged in previous strikes and move weapons capabilities to new and better-secured locations.
2. Israeli strikes against the Houthis in the short term cannot be entirely ruled out, and such an occurrence will likely trigger the Houthi movement to launch new aerial attacks against Israel and maritime attacks in the Red Sea. Nevertheless, at this juncture, Israel is more likely to be inclined not to trigger hostilities vis-a-vis the Houthis to allow for a smooth change of administration in the US. FORECAST: Thus, the Israel-Hamas truce renders a lull of UAV and missile launches from Yemen likely in the short term at least. However, should Hamas accuse Israel of breaking the agreement, the Houthis are highly likely to resume attacks against Israel. Such a scenario is less likely to occur during the first phase of the truce, given that both Hamas and Israel have strong incentives to complete it. 

1. Those operating or residing in the MENA region are advised to continue following developments related to the first phase of the truce.  
2. Those operating or residing in Israel are advised to continue to adhere to all Home Front Command (HFC) guidelines.  
3. Avoid all travel to within ten km (six miles) of the Gaza Strip due to the potential for ceasefire violations to occur. 
4. Remain cognizant of the potential for spontaneous gatherings and protests across Israel over the coming weeks amid heightened political tensions in light of the ceasefire.   
5. MAX Security has strong on-ground capabilities in Israel, including contingency consultation and planning. Contact us at operations@max-security.com or +44 20-3540-0434.   

Militancy 

For travelers/residents/expats  

1. Those operating or residing in Israel are advised to remain extra vigilant due to the potential for additional attempted attacks materializing.   
2. Remain vigilant in crowded commercial areas or public transport hubs, as these locations have been targeted by militants in the past. Be vigilant of and alert authorities to any unattended packages or suspicious individuals in these areas.  
3. In outdoor leisure activities at night, favor sitting in restaurants and bars’ inner area rather than the open-air section, which are more vulnerable to attacks. Refrain from large gatherings outside major nightlife venues.   
4. If an attack unfolds within your vicinity, immediately seek cover, and try to safely disengage from the area as quickly as possible. This is given the risk of secondary attacks and shooting towards assailants by security forces and armed civilians, which could cause collateral damage.  

For security managers  

1. Consider providing situational awareness training for employees, providing them with best practices and procedures relevant for periods of elevated militancy threats.  
2. Please contact us for further information and support.