1. The footage released by the NRF shows dismantled kits of Iranian anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) systems from the Noor/Qader/Ghadir family that are primarily derived from the Chinese C-802 platform. The components most visible in the footage are the white dome-shaped noses, which are the radar homing cabins that are critical for guidance and precision. While it is difficult to differentiate between the different variants within this family, the proliferation of Ghadir would be consistent with Iran’s proclivity to provide the Houthis with relatively advanced systems. The Ghadir’s provision would indicate that Iran is supplying its most advanced system within this missile family, featuring an extended range of 300 kilometers. This is also consistent with Houthi claims regarding operational ranges of some of their missiles.  
2. Furthermore, the cache contained what appears to be an Iranian-origin cruise missile designated by the Houthis as Sejil (sometimes referred to as Sahil). The Houthis first unveiled this missile during a military parade in 2023 but kept it relatively obscured. While publicly available information on the system remains limited, the Houthis claimed it has a range of 180 kilometers and carries a 100-kilogram warhead. Its guidance mechanism remains unknown. The latest NRF seizure appears to be the first reported instance of this specific missile being seized as part of a weapons shipment from Iran, further underscoring Tehran’s proliferation efforts.  
3. The shipment also included turbojet engines used in land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs), specifically those integrated into Iran’s Paveh-family missile system, which the Houthis refer to as the Quds LACM and the US designates as 351 missiles. These engines are critical for providing sustained propulsion over long distances, enabling the missile to maintain low-altitude, terrain-following flight paths that reduce its detectability. The inclusion of such advanced propulsion systems further signals Iran’s direct role in enhancing the Houthis’ strike capabilities beyond anti-ship operations, by enabling long-range precision attacks against land-based targets. In addition, at least two missile systems designated by the Houthis as “Quds Z-0” and “Sayyad” constitute an indication that some Iranian signature LACMs have been converted to surface-to-sea systems, with ranges of 800km according to the group. Therefore, the shipment of the turbojets could also potentially serve the Houthi stockpiles of surface-to-sea missiles.  
4. Overall, the development reiterates Iran’s continued material support to bolster the Houthis’ long-range maritime strike capabilities beyond the legacy anti-ship missile systems the Houthis inherited from the collapsed Yemeni army and government as a result of the civil war. It also highlights that critical core components of the Houthis’ missile systems continue to be sourced by Iran. This further reaffirms that these elements are highly technical and require industrial capabilities and specialized materials that mostly remain beyond the Houthis’ domestic production capacity. 

1. The Ghaem-118 missile, which appears to be based on the American Coyote Block 2/3 system, was also among the intercepted weapons on “al-Sherwa.” Unveiled in February 2025 during the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) Great Prophet 19 military drill, the Ghaem-118 is equipped with an electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) seeker enabling it to lock onto targets using heat signatures or visual contrast. While its specifications remain unconfirmed, the missile is reported to have a range of up to 25 kilometers, making it one of the possible surface-to-air systems with which the Houthis have successfully downed American MQ-9 Reapers and other UAVs several times in the past. The absence of any launch system among the seized components suggests that the Houthis already possess the required launch infrastructure within Yemen. The inclusion of the Ghaem-118 in this cache further indicates that Iran views the Houthis as a frontline ally, supplying them with their advanced and most recently unveiled weapon systems rather than only legacy or first-generation technologies. It also shows that Iran is actively proliferating surface-to-air missile systems, at least the more tactical ones, despite the damage it incurred and the gaps in its own domestic aerial defense umbrella, which surfaced during the Iran-Israel war.  
2. Also included were Misagh-series man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADs), Iran’s versions of the Chinese QW-1, designed to target low-flying aircraft, helicopters, and drones. Their inclusion underscores Iran’s longstanding support for the Houthis’ short-range air defense capabilities, which is relevant to the more tactical aspects of aircraft flying at very low altitudes of several km in Yemen. 

1. A full Shahed-101/107 UAV was seized, along with essential components required for the assembly process of explosive-laden UAVs. The UAV, a compact loitering munition, is part of Iran’s expanding family of proliferated one-way attack UAVs that are designed for precision strikes. Approximately 96 piston engines, typically used to power one-way attack drones, were shown as part of the latest seizure. Iran traditionally acquired these engines from external sources, including by obtaining German/Western-made engines and procuring from Chinese producers, but has also moved on to reverse-engineer and develop such components on its own, particularly through the internationally sanctioned Oje Parvaz Mado Nafar firm (also known as Mado), whose engines were also found in Shahed-136 UAVs exported by Iran to Russia. The seizure also included various guidance systems, stabilizers, and airframes, indicating that the shipment was intended to support a broader drone assembly and sustainment pipeline. 
2. As with the cruise missile parts seized, the UAV-related equipment underscores the Houthis’ dependence on Iranian supplies of critical components for their drone arsenal. Nevertheless, this is likely a more easily maintained supply chain, given the relatively small sizes of these components and the fact that with drones, the Houthis are likely producing some of the basic elements on their own, such as their bodies. 

The images show ruggedized command-and-control (C2) terminals. These laptops are industrial-grade, shock-resistant systems widely used for field deployment. They could serve multiple roles, such as mission planning for UAVs, real-time strike coordination, telemetry processing for missile launches, or mobile radar/fire-control interfaces. The prominent twin-lens unit is likely a dual electro-optical/infrared (EO/IR) surveillance system, distinguishable by its twin-lens configuration and compact turret design. The platform essentially gives a high-resolution daylight camera alongside an infrared sensor, indicating the system’s capability to operate effectively in both daytime and low-light or obscured environments. Parallel to bolstering aerial defense to some extent, such systems could potentially also be used to hunt targets, especially if Houthi forces could mount them on vessels to support intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and target acquisition efforts. As a whole, the provision of radars and sensors further highlights how Iran’s direct material support bolsters the Houthis’ ability to monitor their backyard and project force successfully.